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1. History of EU-Turkey Relations1 
1.1. From economic partnership to institutionalized support: The Spanish 
perspective 
The evolution of bilateral relations between Spain and Turkey has been conditioned by the 
political and economic evolution of the two countries, how the relations between Turkey and 
the EU are structured and the effects of regional instability. So far, neither the political changes 
in one country nor the other, nor the economic crisis, nor the ups and downs that have 
characterized relations between Turkey and the EU have dramatically damaged these relations. 
Internationally, both countries have collaborated in areas such as promotion of the Alliance of 
CiǀilizatioŶs siŶĐe ϮϬϬ4. OŶ the EuƌopeaŶ ageŶda, “paiŶ fullǇ suppoƌts TuƌkeǇ͛s eŶtƌǇ iŶto the 
EU. At a strictly bilateral level, the relations have been upgraded to the highest level (holding of 
regular governmental summits) since the organization of the first High Level Meeting in April 
2009. 
“paiŶ͛s suppoƌt to TuƌkeǇ's EU ŵeŵďeƌship has ƌeŵaiŶed the saŵe iŶ spite of the political 
changes in Madrid. First Felipe González, then José María Aznar and José Luis Rodríguez 
Zapatero, and now Mariano Rajoy, have all supported closer ties between Turkey and the EU. 
Only the arguments put forward to justify this position have changed. The conservatives of the 
Partido Popular have focused on geostrategic and economic factors while the socialists have 
portrayed Turkish accession as a way of bringing Europe, and more generally the Western world, 
closer to Muslim countries and of re-enforcing the inclusive side of European integration, which 
would also help the modernization and democratization of Turkey itself.  
It is worth mentioning that Spain is part of Friends of Turkey (an informal group comprising 
Sweden, Finland, the UK, Spain and Italy), which in October 2011 proposed a three-step plan to 
revive accession talks. Yet, since then, this group has not been active.  
The eleŵeŶt that ďetteƌ eǆplaiŶs the ĐoŶtiŶuous suppoƌt to TuƌkeǇ͛s ŵeŵďeƌship is that uŶlike 
what happens in other European countries, it is a topic that generates little political controversy 
and that is not present among the concerns of the public opinion. However, we have seen that in 
recent years, more sceptical views have been expressed. Conservative politicians have started 
ƋuestioŶiŶg aŶ uŶĐoŶditioŶal suppoƌt to TuƌkeǇ͛s EU ŵeŵďeƌship, iŶsistiŶg that the EU͛s 
aďsoƌptioŶ ĐapaĐitǇ is liŵited, douďtiŶg TuƌkeǇ͛s EuƌopeaŶŶess, aŶd pƌoposiŶg aŶ alteƌŶatiǀe 
such as a privileged partnership. Yet, those positions never become the official line of the party. 
Similarly, it is too early to determine what the effect of the emergence of Podemos for Spanish 
Foreign Policy in general, and for Turkey in particular, will be. In that respect, political 
                                                          
1
 The EU 28 Country Reports were completed before the Turkish Constitutional Referendum on 16 April 2017. 
Thus, the report does not take account of any potential changes in the national debate that might have 
occurred in the meantime. 
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developments in Turkey may contribute to politiĐize the “paŶish deďate oŶ TuƌkeǇ͛s EU 
membership. 
“till, the ŵost likelǇ sĐeŶaƌio is oŶe iŶ ǁhiĐh “paiŶ ĐoŶtiŶues to suppoƌt TuƌkeǇ͛s EuƌopeaŶ 
aspiration but becomes active merely in this particular field and only if other key European 
actors such as Germany and France agree to revive the accession process. 
1.2. The domination of interest-based arguments and consensus on 
narratives 
“paiŶ͛s suppoƌt foƌ Tuƌkish eŶtƌǇ has ďeeŶ Đleaƌ aŶd ĐoŶsisteŶt. The ĐoŵŵoŶ aƌguŵeŶts ďehiŶd 
this support have usually ďeeŶ TuƌkeǇ͛s geostƌategiĐ ǀalue, tƌade liŶks ǁith a dǇŶaŵiĐ eĐoŶoŵǇ, 
the positive impact oŶ TuƌkeǇ͛s deŵoĐƌatizatioŶ pƌoĐess as ǁell as its possiďle ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ to 
the stƌeŶgtheŶiŶg of the MediteƌƌaŶeaŶ aǆis ǁithiŶ the EU, thus helpiŶg to ŵoǀe the EU͛s centre 
of gravity southwards. Moreover, the lack of political and social debates on this issue has given 
the Spanish executive more leeway to design and implement its policies towards Turkey. In 
addition, it is worth mentioning that there are no bilateral disputes between the two countries.  
At the political level, it is worth mentioning that the two countries decided to move their 
relations a step forward with the institutionalization of yearly governmental summits, known as 
High-Level Meetings, launched with the inaugural April 2009 summit in Istanbul, the last of 
which took place in Ankara in February 2014. These meetings gather not only the heads of 
governments and the ministers of foreign affairs but also a wide range of technical ministries 
(energy, industry, education, culture, etc.) in an attempt to explore new fields of cooperation. 
Because of the electoral schedules in both countries, it has not been possible to hold the 
meetings neither in 2015 nor in 2016. 
At the economic level, relations have also developed rapidly, coinciding with the expansion of 
Turkish economy in the 2000s and the implementation of the Customs Union in 1996. According 
to ICEX data, Turkey was the 10th biggest market for Spanish exports in 2015; while, according 
to TUIK, Spain was the 9th biggest export market for Turkey in 2016. Spanish firms have been 
awarded important contracts in the infrastructure sector and there has been a significant 
increase of Spanish investments. In that respect, it is important to highlight the fact that “paiŶ͛s 
second largest bank (BBVA) is the main shareholder of Garanti, the third largest bank in Turkey. 
In sum, interest-based discussions have mostly dominated the debate regarding Turkey and its 
relations with the EU. As identity or value-based discussions have not taken a great part in social 
and political debates or in public opinion, the mainstream narratives have mostly built up on the 
ŵutual eĐoŶoŵiĐ ďeŶefits. The suppoƌt of the “paŶish goǀeƌŶŵeŶt to TuƌkeǇ͛s aĐĐessioŶ is likelǇ 
to continue because the level of opposition of the Spanish public has not yet reached a critical 
point and economic interests at stake are more vital than ever before. The fact that enlargement 
is no longer a priority for the EU also reduces the pressure on the Spanish government to take an 
outspoken position on this particular issue. 
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1.3. Economy and security relations as key policy fields   
EĐoŶoŵiĐ oppoƌtuŶities aŶd stƌategiĐ ĐoŶsideƌatioŶs doŵiŶate “paiŶ͛s disĐussioŶs oŶ TuƌkeǇ. 
Once more, it is important to recall that these discussions are not part of the public debate.  
Maintaining a pro-accession stance benefits the improvement of business opportunities for 
“paŶish ĐoŵpaŶies, aŶd “paiŶ͛s iŵage iŶ TuƌkeǇ aŶd otheƌ ĐaŶdidate ĐouŶtƌies, faĐilitatiŶg the 
development of bilateral relations that were either non-existent or marginal.  
On a more strategic note, when Turkey is discussed in Spain, it inevitably becomes part of 
broader foreign policy considerations on the importance of NATO and transatlantic relations but 
also of the discussion on the nature and the purpose of the EU integration process. In that 
respect, the non-discriminatory and transformative nature of EU enlargement is often 
highlighted.  
Compared to other European countries, it is worth mentioning that immigration was not part of 
the debate on Turkey; probably because of the small size of the Turkish community in Spain.  
2. Future of EU-Turkey relations 
2.1. Mainstream support, little controversy: Views on the future of EU-
Turkey relations  
OŶe of “paiŶ͛s peĐuliaƌities is that although the “oĐialist PaƌtǇ aŶd the Populaƌ PaƌtǇ haǀe 
disagreed on many issues over the foreign policy agenda, they have converged in their support 
foƌ TuƌkeǇ͛s EU ďid. Moƌeoǀeƌ, the tǁo paƌties haǀe ďeeŶ ŵaiŶtaiŶiŶg theiƌ positioŶs ďoth iŶ 
government and in opposition. 
A few exceptions to the mainstream pro-Turkey position in Spain can be found in smaller 
political parties, mainly from the extreme left. On some occasions, these parties have referred to 
human rights, as well as the Kurdish and Armenian issues, as elements to put additional pressure 
on Turkey throughout accession negotiations. Some figures in centre-right nationalist parties 
from Catalonia and the Basque Country have also questioned whether full accession should be 
the ultimate goal of EU-Turkey relations, linking this hesitation to their Christian conception of 
Europe. However, these ideas have neveƌ ďeĐoŵe theiƌ paƌties͛ offiĐial positioŶ. Thus, TuƌkeǇ 
has never been a major issue in the political debate and more importantly, no political party has 
used this issue as part of electoral confrontations. For the time being, unlike to what happens in 
major EU states, we note that Spanish political parties provide little or scant attention to 
TuƌkeǇ͛s iŶtegƌatioŶ pƌoĐess iŶto the EU. We should keep aŶ eǇe oŶ ǁhetheƌ the eŵeƌgeŶĐe of 
Podemos and the domestic changes in Turkey challenge this situation. 
It is interesting to note that the leading think tanks, both in Madrid (FRIDE, Real Instituto Elcano, 
Fundación Altnernativas) and in Barcelona (CIDOB, IEMed) have either been engaged on EU-
Turkey relations or have published analysis regarding the Turkish question. In all these cases, the 
position has been in favour of membership and, above all, against any discriminatory formula. 
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Business circles have also always been inclined in favour of accession, while human rights 
activists have been more cautions. For instance, we do find organizations that have paid 
attention to the human rights situation in Turkey and to the Kurdish question. Yet none of these 
organizations are strong enough to influence public opinion and shape Spanish political debate 
concerning the Turkish question. 
The low intensity of the debate in the political sphere and the media is clearly reflected in the 
state of public opinion. In the few polls available, the Spanish population ends up being one of 
the most favourable in Europe regarding TurkeǇ͛s EU ŵeŵďeƌship, ďut it is also oŶe of the ŵost 
indifferent. Yet, those polls are quite old and it would be interesting to see if the situation has 
changed since recent events put Turkey at the centre of media coverage (Gezi protests, Syria 
war, coup attempt, etc.). 
2.2. Turkey’s accession: a rhetorical commitment?  
The concepts of differentiated integration have not been part of the official debates on EU-
Turkey relations in Spain. While the official political discourse has ďeeŶ iŶ faǀouƌ of TuƌkeǇ͛s 
accession – a view that has been maintained up until today –, at the backstage politicians 
speakiŶg of “paiŶ͛s suppoƌt foƌ TuƌkeǇ͛s ŵeŵďeƌship as a ŵistake haǀe ďeeŶ iŶĐƌeasiŶg. A 
former Christian-democrat MP, Josep Antoni Duran i Lleida, even openly stated that the EU͛s 
invitation to Turkey had been a mistake and that the country should not join the EU. Most 
people having a similar opinion prefer not to say it publically.  
2.3. The gradual politicization of the Spanish debate on Turkey 
From the side of Spain, the emergence of Podemos, a left-wing movement founded in 2014 and 
as of today the third biggest party in the Spanish parliament, has had a major impact on the 
debates on Turkey. With five members in the European Parliament, the party has been 
influential in such debates in terms of changing the  Spanish as well the EP perspectives, bringing 
forward a critical outlook on EU-Turkey relations.  
From the side of Turkey, the refugee deal has been a major event for creating divergences 
among different political parties. The proposal of the European Commission, which was initially 
rejected by Spain, was later signed by the acting Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, notwithstanding 
the Spanish Congress (except for ‘ajoǇ͛s Paƌtido Populaƌ ;PPͿ) rejecting the deal because of its 
incompatibility with international law. Yet this debate did not have vast foreign policy 
repercussions against Turkey and did not prevent the signing of the deal, but has been a clear 
indicator of growing criticism among the Spanish opposition against what they perceive as an 
authoritarian turn in Turkey.  
The combination of the political developments in Spain, most visibly the presence of an anti-
establishment left-wing party with a considerably big electoral base, and the developments in 
Turkey, are politicizing the debates on Turkey for the first time. Yet, it is too early to say whether 
this ǁill lead to a ďƌeak iŶ “paiŶ͛s ĐoŶseŶsus on foreign policy decisions. 
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3. EU-Turkey Relations and the Neighbourhood/Global scene 
3.1. Preferential for Spain, indispensible for the EU: Turkey's role in 
regional conflicts   
Considering recent events in the Middle East in which the EU has a great stake in (e.g. the 
ongoing conflicts in Syria-Iraq and the refugee crisis), TuƌkeǇ͛s leǀeƌage aŶd its importance for 
the EU has increased.  
With the emergence of Islamist governments in the MENA region following the Arab Spring, 
Turkey has become a more attractive partner for the EU because of its access to and influence in 
the region. Yet, TuƌkeǇ͛s ƌole as aŶ iŶteƌŵediaƌǇ ďetǁeeŶ the EU aŶd post-Arab Spring 
governments has been more of an indirect role rather than an official policy agreed upon 
between any of the parties.    
IŶ light of TuƌkeǇ͛s ƌole as a ƌegioŶal aĐtoƌ aŶd its leǀeƌage oŶ the ƌefugee Đƌisis, TuƌkeǇ is 
increasingly perceived as an indispensable partner but also as a human rights violator. In 
intelligence circles, the downing of the Russian jet and some controversial decisions taken ever 
siŶĐe haǀe deteƌioƌated TuƌkeǇ͛s iŵage as a ƌeliaďle NATO allǇ aŶd soŵe staƌt lookiŶg at AŶkaƌa 
as a ͚trouble-maker͛. Yet those decisions are never expressed in public and it is still too early to 
see whether this will have an iŵpaĐt oŶ “paiŶ͛s staŶĐe toǁaƌds TuƌkeǇ.  
OŶ the otheƌ haŶd, “paiŶ͛s effoƌts to stƌeŶgtheŶ the MediteƌƌaŶeaŶ diŵeŶsioŶ of the EU͛s 
foreign policy pushes the country to explore cooperation with other Mediterranean countries, 
Turkey included. Yet, fƌoŵ “paiŶ͛s perspective, the focus of its attention in the South is mostly 
on the Maghreb, a sub-ƌegioŶ ǁheƌe TuƌkeǇ͛s iŶflueŶĐe is Ƌuite liŵited. 
3.2. Potential areas of cooperation  
Spain and Turkey have both been essential pieces in the configuration of a common European 
iŶteƌest iŶ the aƌea of eŶeƌgǇ. TuƌkeǇ͛s positioŶ as a ĐouŶtƌǇ of tƌaŶsit foƌ the eŶeƌgǇ consumed 
by Europe makes energy and energy security a major area of cooperation. Cooperation between 
the emergency teams of the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency and its 
Spanish equivalent became part of the agenda coinciding with the war in Syria. The cooperation 
of the two countries at a Euro-Mediterranean level, which has already been ongoing through 
organizations such as the Union for the Mediterranean, will continue to play an important role in 
the tǁo ĐouŶtƌies͛ ƌelatioŶs. Last ďut Ŷot least, ƌegioŶal seĐuƌitǇ iŶ the fƌaŵeǁoƌk of NATO has 
been an essential area of cooperation, and will continue to be so. 
3.3. The Erdoğan factor 
The rise of the paradigm of the emerging powers has made Turkey more attractive both to Spain 
and the EU in general. It remains to be seen whether this paradigm that is increasingly perceived 
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as a ďuďďle, togetheƌ ǁith speĐifiĐ ĐhalleŶges to TuƌkeǇ͛s eĐoŶoŵǇ, Đould diŵiŶish this 
attractiveness.  
On the other side, President Recep Tayyip EƌdoğaŶ is increasingly associated with the new forms 
of authoƌitaƌiaŶ leadeƌship iŶ “paiŶ͛s puďliĐ deďate, together with countries like Russia, and this 
deteƌioƌates TuƌkeǇ͛s iŵage aŵoŶg the Spanish society. Putting it differently, it has become 
increasingly difficult for Spanish politicians to praise EƌdoğaŶ in public. 
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